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Abstract: This paper aims at comparing the definition of ‘trademark’ in three 
different legal systems – EU law, international law and US common law – in 
order to identify the discoursal, generic and textual characteristics of definition 
as a genre. The selected corpus of analysis is made up of three definitions from 
EU Regulation 2017/1001, WTO Agreement on Trade-Related aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and US Lanham Act (sec.45) and of 
several US cases from 1926 to 2019. The theoretical framework within which 
the analysis is carried out is the seminal work on definition as carried out by 
Richard Robinson (1954) and Harris and Hutton (2007). The approach is 
mainly linguistic, though a historical excursus on the concept of definition is 
provided as a necessary introductory premise. The findings demonstrate that 
EU legal texts are characterised by a hybrid style (Robertson 2010) which 
results from the combination of common law and civil law textual features. 
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The analysis of the definitional sections here displayed supports this point and 
confirms that EU term formation and definition are text-driven (Šarčević 
2016). EU legal texts in their English version originate from the dynamic 
combination of two aspects: one connected to EU legal English – which is not 
common law English – and one connected to matters of terminology, syntax 
and general structure which has a French origin. 
 
Key words: definition; legal language; discourse analysis; interpretation; 
semiotics. 
 
DEFINICJA JAKO GATUNEK W TRZECH SYSTEMACH 
PRAWNYCH: ANALIZA PORÓWNAWCZA 
 
Abstrakt: W artykule porównuje się definicje pojęcia ‘trademark’ w trzech 
systemach prawnych – prawie UE, prawie międzynarodowym i amerykańskim 
common law – w celu określenia dyskursywnych, gatunkowych i tekstowych 
cech definicji jako gatunku. Korpus analizowanych tekstów składa się z trzech 
definicji zawartych w rozporządzeniu UE 2017/1001, Porozumieniu WTO 
w sprawie handlowych aspektów praw własności intelektualnej (TRIPS) 
i amerykańskiej ustawie Lanhama (par. 45) oraz w aktach kilku spraw 
sądowych z USA z lat 1926-2019. Ramy teoretyczne analizy zawarte 
są w pracach poświęconych zagadnieniu definicji autorstwa Richarda 
Robinsona (1954) oraz Harrisa i Huttona (2007). Niniejsza praca 
ma zasadniczo charakter językoznawczy, zawiera jednak także niezbędny 
tu wprowadzający ekskurs historyczny. Rezultaty badania wskazują, że teksty 
prawne UE charakteryzuje styl hybrydowy (Robertson 2010), wynikający 
z połączenia cech prawa common law i prawa kontynentalnego. Świadczy 
o tym analiza omówionych w pracy partii definiujących, która zarazem 
potwierdza, że kształtowanie się terminu unijnego i jego definicja mają 
charakter tekstowy (text-driven) (Šarčević 2016). Teksty prawne UE w wersji 
angielskiej powstają z dynamicznego połączenia dwóch aspektów: pierwszy 
wiąże się z prawnym językiem angielskim UE – który nie jest angielszczyzną 
common law – a drugi z problematyką terminologii, składni i struktury ogólnej. 
 
Słowa kluczowe: definicja; język prawny; analiza dyskursu; interpretacja; 
semiotyka. 
 
LA DEFINIZIONE COME GENERE IN TRE ORDINAMENTI 
GIURIDICI: UN’ANALISI CONTRASTIVA 
 
Abstract: Il presente contributo mette a confronto la definizione di 
‘trademark’ come riconosciuta in tre diversi ordinamenti giuridici - diritto 
comunitario, diritto internazionale e common law statunitense - al fine di 
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identificare le caratteristiche della definizione come genere testuale. Il corpus 
di analisi è costituito da tre definizioni tratte dal Regolamento UE 2017/1001, 
dall'Agreement on Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), dal Lanham Act e da diversi casi dibattuti fra il 1926 e il 2019 nei 
tribunali statunitensi. Il quadro teorico all'interno del quale si svolge l'analisi è 
la ricerca sulla definizione svolto da Richard Robinson (1954) e Harris e 
Hutton (2007). L'approccio è prevalentemente linguistico, anche se un 
excursus storico sul concetto di definizione è fornito come necessaria premessa 
introduttiva. I risultati dimostrano che i testi giuridici dell'UE sono 
caratterizzati da uno stile ibrido (Robertson 2010) che deriva dalla 
combinazione delle caratteristiche testuali del diritto comune e del diritto 
civile. L'analisi delle sezioni di definizione qui analizzate supporta questo 
punto e conferma che la formazione e la definizione dei termini UE sono text-
driven (Šarčević 2016). I testi giuridici comunitari nella loro versione inglese 
hanno origine dalla combinazione dinamica di due aspetti: uno legato 
all'inglese giuridico dell'Unione - che non è l'inglese del common law - e uno 
legato a questioni terminologiche, sintattiche e generiche da ricondurre alla 
lingua francese.  
 
Key words: definizione; linguaggio legale; analisi del discorso; 
interpretazione; semiotica. 
1. Introduction 
The original stimulus for this paper was an enlightening paper by Colin 
Robertson (2012) who carried out a comparative analysis between 
common law and civil law discoursal, generic and linguistic 
peculiarities in order to identify their influence on European Legal 
English. Although many other scholars have investigated the 
differences and similarities of common law and civil law legal systems 
(Bhatia 1993, Foley 2002, Pozzo 2016, Šarčević 2016) from different 
perspectives, Robertson assumes that EU Legal English is neither a 
dialect nor a variant of standard English but a new genre. As a genre, 
Robertson (2010, 2011, 2012) and other scholars (Mattila 2013, 
Cacchiani 2015, Felici 2016) recognize hybridity as one of the main 
characteristics of EU legal discourse, whose source of creation are 
treaties – prototypical textual expression of international law – and 
whose textual outcome are binding documents, drafted in ‘the’ English 
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– which is not the common law language – and characterised by 
terminology, syntax and general structure of French origin.  
As definitions are an important section in EU legal documents 
– in particular in regulations and directives – in international 
agreements and in common law statutes, this paper aims at identifying 
the linguistic (textual and discoursal) peculiarities and the cognitive 
structure of these sections in a selected collection which consists of the 
definition of the term ‘trademark’ in European, international and 
common law context of competition law. In order to carry out this 
analysis, the seminal work on definition by Richard Robinson (1954) 
provides the theoretical framework which has been complemented with 
Harris and Hutton’s integrationist approach (2007) applied to legal 
definition, which makes Robinson’s stipulative definition central to the 
topic of definition.  
The discoursal hybridity which characterizes EU legal texts is 
ascribable to the peculiarity of the European legal order, where the 
coexistence of national, international and supranational law reflects the 
society which these legal orders regulate, and addresses “a need for 
consistency, coherence, predictability and certainty [which] leads to 
efforts to harmonize the rules across the range of fields and make them 
compatible with each other” (Robertson 2016: 42).  
The concept behind and within ‘trademark’ seems to be a 
telling example of the hybridity – discoursal, terminological, cognitive 
but also jurisprudential – which characterizes EU textography (Swales 
1998). As an example, it sheds light on the ‘crucible’, namely on the 
space in which EU “legislative language is tested and refined” (Foley 
2002: 362) and proves the European legal order to be “a synthesis of 
interaction of the relevant rules of international law and the laws and 
jurisprudence of the European Union” (Muravyov 2003 in Smyrnova 
2013: 126).   
Thus, the ultimate aim of this paper is to demonstrate whether 
the discoursal hybridity of EU legal language – which results from the 
process of legal harmonization – is recognisable in the definitional 
sections of EU legal acts and whether these definitional sections have 
the features of a text type “developed as a pattern of message for certain 
communicative situation […] evolved from conventionalised 
situations” (Sager 1997). As legislative statements have a 
conventionalized communicative purpose (Bhatia 1993: 117), this 
analysis questions whether definitional sections (or definitions) in legal 
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documents have the characteristics of a subgenre since they serve one 
main communicative purpose. 
The concept selected for the analysis belongs to the branch of 
competition law, because the three legal systems of reference have a 
consolidated tradition in this field and in particular, according to the EU 
legislative praxis as ratified in art. 103 TFEU “The Union shall have 
exclusive competence in the […] establishing of the competition rules 
necessary for the functioning of the internal market”. 
2. Method and material  
The analysis used three definitions of the term ‘trade(-)mark’ as shown 
in EU Regulation 2017/1001 – as an example of supranational law, in 
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights – as an example of international law, and in US Lanham Act and 
certain of US cases from 1926 to 2019 – as an example of national (and 
common) law. The method adopted to describe the textual and generic 
characteristics of the definitions was genre analysis (Bhatia 1993, 2004; 
Swales 1998) and in particular the structural interpretation of the text-
genre as presented in Bhatia (1993: 29-34) in terms of interactive 
cognitive structure. For each definition, the cognitive structure was 
made clear through a graphic representation, which emphasized two 
main aspects: 1) each step (Rasmussen and Engberg 1999) or move 
(Swales 1990; Bhatia 1993) recognizable in the definitions at issue 
(estensive, intensive, ostensive, denotative, implicative, and rule-giving 
to name but a few) fulfilled a particular communicative function; 2) the 
combination of the identified steps created recurrent patterns, which 
were useful variables to investigate and identify genres.  
3. Theoretical framework 
Even though there may be a common agreement on the usefulness of 
‘definition’ as a procedure to understand the essential nature of a thing 
or a word used by some actual individuals which, otherwise, would not 
be able to give sense to the material and immaterial phenomena which 
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characterise their everyday life, it is difficult to provide an unambiguous 
and universally accepted definition of ‘definition’ since it is a 
multifaced concept which has been investigated for centuries – starting 
from Plato in the IV century B.C. – by philosophers, logicians, 
mathematicians and linguists from different epistemological 
perspectives. The simple and common-sense definition (also known as 
lexical definition) provided in the opening sentence of this paragraph is 
just one out of eighteen species of definition which Robinson (1954: 7) 
identifies and which are ascribable to three main approaches to 
definitions: realist, nominalist and conceptualist. In addition, Harris and 
Hutton (2007: 18-19) propose their “integrationist approach [which] 
recognizes definitions as being stipulative” since “they provide 
practical guidelines for the conduct of communicational activities”. 
After presenting these approaches theoretically but briefly – due to the 
limited space and the purpose of this paper – in the next section, they 
will be applied to legal definitions and in particular to a collection of 
definitions from legal written documents which belong to three legal 
systems: EU law, international law and US common law (and case law). 
3.1. Definition defined 
By the phrase ‘species of definition’ mentioned in the paragraph above, 
Robinson refers to both purposes and methods of a definition. Basically, 
a definition is a mental activity, which provides the ground where logic 
and psychology touch and which may be described as a “secondary 
symbolic activity” (Robinson 1954: 13), namely a subsequent process 
that reflects on the use of symbols or linguistic signs. As far as 
communicative purpose is concerned, a preliminary distinction between 
real definition (or definition of things, or res) and nominal definition 
(be it a word-word definition or a word-thing definition or definition of 
words, nomina) is necessary. The former kind of definition – real 
definition or thing-thing definition – dates back to Socrates and Plato, 
who are “the inventors of the notion of definition” (Robinson 1954: 
149) and to Aristotle. In many writings, Plato’s model of discussion 
starts with a question having the form ‘What is x?’, namely with a 
request for a definition. In particular, in Theaetetus, the question to 
answer through the dialogue is ‘What is logos?’ where logos is a thing 
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and not a word. The answer presupposes that one already knows the use 
of the word, which, as something that is a weaving together of the 
names of the elements of a thing, must be suitably explanatory (Fine 
1979). If with Plato, logos refers to either ‘sentence’ or ‘statement’ or 
‘explanation’ or ‘account’ producing knowledge – namely to definition 
– Aristotle in Topics defines definition as “the statement that gives the 
essence” of a thing, not of a word. The reocentric view of meaning 
(Harris and Hutton 2007: 24) – which links Plato, Aristotle, Cicero (in 
Rhetorica ad Herennium, Book IV, “Definition in brief and clear-cut 
fashion grasps the characteristic qualities of a thing, […] and is 
accounted useful for […] it sets forth the full meaning and character of 
a thing so lucidly and briefly that to express it in more words seems 
superfluous, and to express it in fewer is considered impossible”) over 
the centuries through Spinoza to J.S. Mill – depends on the existence of 
the ‘x’ mentioned in the question. Thus real definition appears as an 
Analysis, with a capital letter, since several processes – ‘abstraction’, 
‘relation’, ‘synthesis’ and ‘substitution’ – from which the vague 
formula ‘What is x?’ flourishes from are implied (Robinson 1954: 
178ff). The analytic enumeration of the simple ideas (Locke 1706) 
which combine in the meaning of the term to be defined, hints at the 
existence of complex ideas made up of simple ideas or natural kind 
terms which “play an important role of pointing to common ‘essential 
features’ or ‘mechanisms’ beyond and below the obvious distinguishing 
characteristics” (Putnam 1970: 188) and which, for this reason, are not 
definable. 
In contrast with this last assertion on indefinability, Robinson 
states that “nothing is lexically indefinable” (1954: 41) and that this 
consolidated misunderstanding is due – among different reasons 
connected to the emotional force and the indicative power of a word – 
to the fact that ‘indefinable’ does not mean ‘non-admitting a definition’ 
but rather ‘non-requiring a definition’. This refers to the 
abovementioned nominal definition, which exists as word-word 
definition or as word-thing definition. 
Word-word definition has the form of an interlingual 
translation, as it is “an interpretation of verbal signs by means of other 
signs of some other language” (Jakobson 1959: 233) and it correlates a 
word to another word having the same meaning; word-thing definition 
correlates a word to a thing. The relationship established between a 
word and a thing serves two distinct purposes and originates the lexical 
(or historical) definition and the stipulative (or legislative) definition.  
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Lexical definition, which provides a customary or dictionary 
meaning of the word at issue, is a form of history (Robinson 1954: 35) 
and reports “the meaning that a word has in a language” (Hurley 1988: 
82). It basically involves three agents: the definer (or the 
lexicographer), the hearer (or reader) and the user (or the individual 
whose usage of the word gives the word itself the meaning it has). It 
provides four dimensions of the word in question, namely the 
contextual, the syntactical, the expressive and the indicative one, since 
its ultimate goal is to say how words are used. As descriptive linguists, 
lexicographers empirically analyse and describe a language with a 
traditional emphasis on individual items of vocabulary and fulfil a 
function of mediation between the community of linguists and the 
community at large (Kirkness 2004). With Harris and Hutton (2007: 
78), “lexicographical definition is deliberately constructed and 
allocated by the lexicographer on the basis of materials selected for 
study, and its allocation depends on the viewpoint the lexicographer has 
chosen to adopt”. As a matter of fact, dictionaries are “books or banks 
about words” (Kirkness 2004: 59), while encyclopaedias are “ books or 
banks about facts” (Kirkness 2004: 59): “the Cyclopaedia describes 
things, the Dictionary explains words, and deals with the description of 
things only so far as is necessary in order to fix the exact signification 
and use of words” (Murray 1884 in Harris and Hutton 2007: 81, italics 
in the original). Yet, although the distinction between dictionaries and 
encyclopaedias is pretty obvious, “a hard and fast distinction between 
lexical and encyclopaedic information is not possible […] since humans 
use language to communicate about facts, things or people” (Kirkness 
2004: 59) through linguistic signs. 
Stipulative definition, which provides one’s own meaning for a 
word and reports or establishes the meaning of a (linguistic) sign, is “an 
announcement of what is going to be meant by it in a work, or a request 
to the reader to take it in that sense” (Robinson 1954: 59). In the act of 
assigning an object to a name, the lexicographer is not recording an 
already existing assignment, but is showing how words should be used 
(Robinson 1954: 59). From the legal Latin word stipulatio, which 
means “a solemn promise, a contract, or an obligation”, stipulative 
definition makes the lexicographer a legislator (Robinson 1954: 54) or 
an arbiter (Robinson 1954: 56) who attempts to replace the varieties of 
actual usage by a single unambiguous usage. As a request or a binding 
commitment, stipulative definition is a proposal rather than a 
proposition and looks to the future – not to the past – in a sort of “turning 
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our backs to reality” (Robinson 1954: 69). In Harris and Hutton (2007: 
71), “stipulative definitions function as performatives – in something 
like the Austinian sense of performative” – thus are subject to the kinds 
of Austinian felicity conditions which performatives in general are 
subject to. In particular, stipulative definitions – like performatives – do 
not ‘describe’ or ‘report’ or constate anything at all, are not ‘true or 
false’ (Austin 1962: 5) and in their lack of truth value, they display their 
arbitrariness (Robinson 1954: 67) and at the same time their function as 
a cure for ambiguity. Arbitrariness and ambiguity, but also peculiarity 
and distinctiveness, characterize legal language when it comes to 
questions of definition (Goodrich 1987: 54). Since performatives are 
assertion that do not describe or expose a certain state of affairs, but 
allows the speaker to perform a real action, what is said to be done is 
accomplished and consequently a real fact is immediately produced. 
Performative acts, which according to Austin started from a basic 
premiss about language as social action, are always situated. If every 
utterance is a performance, the utterer is actually doing something, 
which is taken to be the “equivalent of intending something” (Goodrich 
1987: 74). When the speech act is legal, to do or to intend something 
may be interpreted in two ways: on the one hand, it may mean that 
normative or directive statements are intended to affect behaviour, since 
law prescribes behaviour by means of a generic set of conventional 
meanings. On the other hand, it may refer to the utterer’s intentions (the 
intentions within a rule or a statute) which have to be recognised by the 
listener who intends the intentions behind the utterer’s words (Hart 
1952) and for this reason this second sense pertains to the realm of 
subjectivity. This look at law in terms of being a concept connected to 
social life implies that legal norms are acts of will “intentionally 
directed to the behaviour of another” (Kelsen 1981: 180) and as legal 
speech acts, they have a formal rather than material attribute. Legal 
speech acts are different from everyday speech acts in that they “invoke 
the rules and conventions of the law and carries with it a certain legal 
force” (Fiorito 2006: 103), they create obligations, permissions, and 
prohibitions. As an example, it is possible to mention international 
treaties, conventions and protocols which are all different names to refer 
to what they are in their essence, namely contracts (Robertson 2016: 
60) which compel the parties to perform the acts as recorded in their 
agreement.  
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3.2. Legal definition defined 
Law only exists in human language (Braekhus 1956 in Mattila 2013, 
Goźdź-Roszkowski 2011, Engberg 2016) though legal meaning may be 
different from linguistic meaning (Robertson 2016: 141). Methods of 
interpretation of legal texts may vary according to the generic feature 
of the document (Jopek-Bosiacka 2011), thus specific definition is “the 
chief means by which the precise meaning of a lexical unit is 
determined and legal certainty is guaranteed” (Alcáraz and Hughes 
2014: 30). As Down (in Alcáraz and Hughes 2014) pointed out, 
interpreting a legal text is construing it ideologically; constructing a 
legal text is creating it linguistically. Once the legal text has been 
created, namely constructed, it has to be construed or interpreted by 
judges or other legal professionals. Allowing that the purpose of 
interpretation is to construe the law, the legal text is an element in this 
exegetical process which may take place according to a literal or a 
liberal approach (Walker 2001 in Robertson 2016: 65): “the need for 
the courts to try to appreciate the overriding intention of the legislation, 
the general policy behind the Act and the need to further remedies and 
not take refuge in pettifogging verbal objections”. Alcáraz and Hughes 
further elaborate on the liberal approach and identify other rules of 
judicial interpretation: the holistic rule (legal documents are to be 
interpreted as a whole), the golden rule (ordinary words are to be 
intended as ordinary words, technical terms as technical terms), the 
mischief rule (in amending legal texts ambiguous terms are to be 
construed to facilitate the amending purpose), the ejusdem generis rule 
(in the presence of a list of hyponyms followed by general words, 
general words are to be interpreted as referring to other specific items 
belonging to the same class as the hyponyms), and the rule expression 
unius est exclusion alterius (in the presence of a list of specific items 
and in the absence of generic words, the list is to be considered 
explicitly complete). Not only is the literal approach just one out of 
several approaches to interpret legal texts, but judicial approaches to 
interpretation are influenced by the context within the disputes take 
place and by the legal order of reference. Nonetheless it is possible to 
identify a ‘canon of interpretation’, a rule for those involved in the 
exegetical process, which tends to favour a common sense result rather 
than a strictly legal or logical outcome, called the rule of leniency, 
which holds that “any lexical vagueness or syntactic ambiguity is to be 
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interpreted against the drafter in both civil and criminal law” (Alcáraz 
and Hughes 2014: 30).  
From a semiotic point of view, the words with which legal 
documents are drafted are mere signs, “indirect expressions of a reality” 
(Tiefenbrun 1986: 97), and may be explicit – providing a 
monoreferential correspondence between word and reality –, deceptive 
explicit or implicit – when the correspondence between word and 
reality is not limited to one immediately identifiable meaning. 
Therefore, both meaning and misunderstanding (linguistic and legal) 
are located in an intricate relation of signifier/signified/referent 
(Tiefenbrun 1986: 103) and in this semiotic process of Piercean 
mediation or thirdness – which characterises the indirect nature of the 
law – “legal language in written form takes place” (Robertson 2016: 
135). These principles also inform Wille’s tripartite ‘method’ (1944) 
which recognise three stages in the construction of satisfactory legal 
definitions: as with (legal) definitions the difficulties arise when it is 
hard to identify the superordinate or the genus of the term to be defined 
(the ‘impossibility thesis’ by Benthan 1960 in Hacker 1969: 343), three 
stages – formation, legal effect or consequence and extinction, namely 
birth, life and death – may serve the purpose of constructing legal 
definitions of primary legal ideas. In law, the process of mediation 
carried out by drafters and judges is a process of interpretation which is 
not grounded in rules whose meaning is clear and fully determinate in 
a positivist and Saussurean fashion (Tiefenbrun 1986; Jopek-Bosiacka 
2011), but in more realistic and Piercean terms it is a subjective and 
relatively free mental activity. To Pierce, law is a provisional and open-
ended system (Kevelson 1992), which, tackling the contradiction and 
paradox inherent in language and in human relations, is prescriptive 
rather than descriptive, incomplete and reinterpretable. From this 
perspective, the presence of definition in legal documents and contexts 
is reasonably justified and fulfils a crucial communicative and 
operational function, “as shorthand expressions [which] permit the 
saving of time and energy” (Cairns 1936: 1102).  
In addition, “although the legislature cannot change the 
ordinary meaning of [a word], it does have the power to define the term 
for the purposes of its legislation” (Tiersma 2000: 116-117) as they are 
“rules of law” (Cairns 1936: 1103) which however, due to the 
impossibility to “devise a rule covering all such possible cases in 
advance”, cannot be considered statements of facts in their attempt to 
be all-inclusive, accessible and transparent (Bhatia 1993, 2010). Words 
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are correlated with the fact not solely by the rules of standard English, 
but also by the rules of law.  
In his method of elucidation, Hart (1954) states that the general 
characteristics of legal language are, first of all, a typical context where 
legal words are at work. There, by analysing statements of ‘rights’ and 
‘duties’ – and other legal words – as predictions, namely as texts having 
a peculiar cognitive property (like instructions, according to Werlich’s 
text typologies (1976), without options and whose communicative 
function is not to predict the future but to refer to the present without 
describing it), Hart has no doubt that legal words neither stand for nor 
describe nor state the existence of anything, but that “when someone 
has a legal right a corresponding prediction will normally be justified” 
(Hart 1954: 27).  
A second characteristic of legal language is the existence of a 
legal system made of rules, a third characteristic is that “the same 
assertion varies its communicative effect according to the function of 
the speaker who utters it” (Hart 1954: 29) and the fourth and last 
characteristic is that in any system, rules may attach identical 
consequences to any one of a set of very different facts (Hart 1954: 30). 
Hart’s truth-conditional definition rejects any sort of analytic definition 
(Hacker 1969) and suggests a peculiar use of legal concepts rather than 
peculiar meanings, since “the common use of the words is known but 
not understood” (Hart 1954: 37). Strictly connected to the above 
mentioned contextual aspect, in legislative provisions there is a further 
‘unique contextual factor’: the drafting community’s first concern is to 
give in the legal document an honest expression to the intentions of the 
legislative institution they serve (Bhatia 2010: 46), but, even though the 
document is meant for ordinary citizens, “the real readers are lawyers 
and judges, who are responsible for interpreting those provisions for 
ordinary citizens” (Bhatia 1993: 103).  
As it is clear now that the purpose of legal language and in 
particular of legal definitions is better fulfilled by stipulation rather than 
by analysis, a third complementary perspective on legal definition is 
offered by the integrational approach (Harris and Hutton 2007), which 
makes semantic indeterminacy the background against which 
participants “construct, impose, contest and debate meaning and seek 
to impose or deny order, coherence and narrative” (Harris and Hutton 
2007: 194). Integrationist indeterminacy is radical and context-oriented 
as “the sign does not have its own meaning: it is made to mean whatever 
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the circumstances require […] and is subject to recontextualization” 
(Harris and Hutton 2007: 201-202). 
The principles and conventions applied to formulate legal 
definitions mainly depend on five factors as indicated by Jopek-
Bosiacka (2011: 9): 1) type of legal genre; 2) position in the instrument; 
3) type of legal definition; 4) legal system; 5) branch of law. For the 
purposes of this paper, as established in the introduction, the branch of 
law taken into account is competition law and the contextual legal 
systems are EU law, international law and, US common law (and case 
law). As far as concerns the other factors, they are variable or do not 
provide any operative premise to the analysis since the paper aims at 
investigating how different definitions of the same legal concept are 
influenced by different generic, textual and legal contexts. 
3.2.1. ‘Trade (-) mark’ defined 
The word ‘trademark’ is highly evocative and once mentioned, 
generally pictures of famous brands and logos appear in the mind of the 
general public. People in general agree that trademarks can be valuable 
for companies, though they would not be equally aware of the fact that 
trademarks are the most valuable assets in a majority of modern global 
companies. Trademark value is increasing rapidly in modern society, 
where more and more of world business is intangible, and consists of 
trademarks, patents and such assets. Although in everyday speech – and 
in General English dictionaries, too – trademark and brand are used as 
synonymous concepts, from a legal perspective there are crucial 
differences. As a matter of fact, the conventional definition of 
‘trademark’ provided by the online Merriam-Webster Dictionary: 
1: a device (such as a word) pointing distinctly to the origin or 
ownership of merchandise to which it is applied and legally reserved to 
the exclusive use of the owner as maker or seller 2: a distinguishing 
characteristic or feature firmly associated with a person or thing1.  
 
1 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/trademark (accessed 
25.06.20) 
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is followed by the section of synonyms, where the only entry is ‘brand’. 
The same happens with the Britannica Encyclopaedia, which considers 
‘brand name’ as an alternative title to ‘trademark’, whose definition 
reads  
Trademark, any visible sign or device used by a business enterprise to 
identify its goods and distinguish them from those made or carried by 
others. Trademarks may be words or groups of words, letters, numerals, 
devices, names, the shape or other presentation of products or their 
packages, colour combinations with signs, combinations of colours, and 
combinations of any of the enumerated signs2.  
From the legal point of view, ‘brand’ is a term that refers to a social 
activity which may help to build a reputation and thus comprises, 
among other things, marketing activities. Branding may therefore be 
defined as a social activity. ‘Trademark’ is a term that refers to a ‘social 
construction’, as it is nourished and developed in relation to a 
company’s existing potential customers and stakeholders. Thus, 
trademarks are also legal constructions defined and explained by 
trademark law. The value of a brand is called ‘brand equity’ and it is 
based on the presumption that a well-known brand will generate more 
revenue because potential customers will believe that a product with a 
well-known brand is better than a product that is less famous. Brand 
equity is an asset as crucial as impossible to quantify and within its core 
trademarks are located. As the definition of ‘trademark’ reads – and 
confirms – in The Advanced Dictionary of Marketing (2008: 265), 
‘trade-marks’: 
 
are protective legal rights covering words, symbols, phrases, names, or 
other devices or combinations of such devices associated with 
ownership of a product or service, and trade secrets, which are 
processes, patterns, formulas, devices, information, and the like that are 
known only to their owner (or, in the case of a firm, the owner’s 
employees). 
 
In his telling semiotic interpretation of modern trademark, which appear 
as a ‘floating signifier’, Beebe (2004: 622) recognises a triadic structure 
in every trademark, which appears to be “a set of semiotic relations of 
reference” among a signifier (or a tangible symbol), a signified (or a 
type of use) and a referent (or a function or a product). This relational 
 
2 https://www.britannica.com/topic/trademark (accessed 25.06.20) 
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nature, which is inspired with Saussurean semiology and informs the 
trademark as a ‘full-blow sign’ and not as a mere signifier, often fails 
to be recognised and would be the cause of judicial error (Beebe 2004: 
650). This premise is necessary since the three elements identified by 
Beebe and their relation make the trademark deserving of ‘trademark 
rights’ and this last aspect is inevitably linked to the legal definition of 
‘trademark’. The legal definitions which make up the corpus of analysis 
of this research are presented below in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Legal definitions of Trade(-)mark analysed in this article. 
REGULATION (EU) 2017/1001 OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 14 June 2017 on the 
European Union trade mark. 
CHAPTER II 
THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE MARKS  
SECTION 1  
Definition of an EU trade mark and obtaining an EU trade mark  
Article 4  
Signs of which an EU trade mark may consist  
An EU trade mark may consist of any signs, in particular words, including 
personal names, or designs, letters, numerals, colours, the shape of goods or 
of the packaging of goods, or sounds, provided that such signs are capable 
of: (a) distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those 
of other undertakings; and (b) being represented on the Register of European 
Union trade marks (‘the Register’), in a manner which enables the 
competent authorities and the public to determine the clear and precise 
subject matter of the protection afforded to its proprietor.  
Article 5  
Persons who can be proprietors of EU trade marks  
Any natural or legal person, including authorities established under public 
law, may be the proprietor of an EU trade mark.  
Article 6  
Means whereby an EU trade mark is obtained  
An EU trade mark shall be obtained by registration. 
Article 7  
Absolute grounds for refusal 
The following shall not be registered: […] 
Article 8  
Relative grounds for refusal  
Upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark 
applied for shall not be registered: […] 
AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
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(as amended on 23 January 2017) 
ANNEX 1C 
SECTION 2: TRADEMARKS 
Article 15 
Protectable Subject Matter 
1. Any sign, or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the 
goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings, shall 
be capable of constituting a trademark. Such signs, in particular words 
including personal names, letters, numerals, figurative elements and 
combinations of colours as well as any combination of such signs, shall be 
eligible for registration as trademarks. Where signs are not inherently 
capable of distinguishing the relevant goods or services, Members may 
make registrability depend on distinctiveness acquired through use. 
Members may require, as a condition of registration, that signs be visually 
perceptible. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not be understood to prevent a Member from denying 
registration of a trademark on other grounds, provided that they do not 
derogate from the provisions of the Paris Convention (1967). 
3. Members may make registrability depend on use. However, actual use of 
a trademark shall not be a condition for filing an application for registration. 
An application shall not be refused solely on the ground that intended use 
has not taken place before the expiry of a period of three years from the date 
of application. 
4. The nature of the goods or services to which a trademark is to be applied 
shall in no case form an obstacle to registration of the trademark. 
5. Members shall publish each trademark either before it is registered or 
promptly after it is registered and shall afford a reasonable opportunity for 
petitions to cancel the registration. In addition, Members may afford an 
opportunity for the registration of a trademark to be opposed. 
Lanham Act – TITLE X - Construction and definition; intent of the 
chapter; § 45 (15 U.S.C. § 1127). 
The term “trademark” includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof— 
(1) used by a person, or 
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies  
to register on the principal register established by this chapter, to identify 
and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those 
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even 
if that source is unknown. 
 
The three factors which lead the analysis – type of legal genre, 
position in the instrument, and type of legal definition – cannot exclude 
a preliminary orthographic remark: in Regulation (EU) 2017/1001, the 
term at issue is written as a two-word term. Although this is not a radical 
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deviation, nonetheless it is choice made by EU drafters if not to avoid 
misunderstanding or overlapping of a European Union law concept with 
other terms from other legal systems (Engberg 2016; Šarčević 2016; 
Anselmi and Seracini 2015), at least to differentiate the spelling of the 
EU term. In the WTO Agreement and in the US Statute (respectively 
the second and the third document presented in Table 1) the term is 
written as a one-word item. Yet, a hyphenated version (trade-mark) was 
used habitually at the end of the XIX century and at the beginning of 
the XX century in the US Trade Mark Act of 1881 and in legal 
judgments such as in Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co. 
(1901).  
As far as concerns the type of legal genre, the EU regulation is 
an example of secondary legislation, which implements the principles 
expressed in one or more supranational treaties (primary legislation and 
typical instrument of international law). Thus, from a treaty – 
voluntarily negotiated by each member state – regulations derive as 
legally binding documents, immediately after the Member State have 
ratified them, and become part of the national legal framework of the 
Member State itself. Regulations – and other legal documents such as 
directives and decisions – are unique instruments at the EU disposal and 
characterize the European legal discourse. The second definition is 
taken from the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) as amended on 23 January 2017 as an example 
from international law. International agreements are voluntarily 
negotiated and ratified documents and their canon is defined in the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: a treaty is an “agreement 
concluded between States in written form and governed by international 
law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related 
instruments and whatever its particular designation”. The third 
definition is from Lanham Act, also known as Trademark Act, which is 
the primary trademark statute in the United States of America. Despite 
the fact that in the English system of common law judge-made law 
based on the precedents has always had a prominent role, statutes are 
the actual form of legislative activity of the British Parliament or the 
American Congress.  
The EU Regulation, the WTO Agreement and the US Act have 
their own characteristic structure or canon which – as far as concerns 
EU regulations - is codified in official documents like, for example, the 
Joint Practical Guide of the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission for persons involved in the drafting of European Union 
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legislation (2015). There, it is specified that “[t]he definition must not 
be contrary to the ordinary meaning of the term (section 14.1) [and] 
must not contain autonomous normative provisions (section 14.4)”. 
This established canon gives definitions a precise location, and as far as 
concerns the three examples at issues, in the EU Regulation it has a 
dedicated section at the beginning of the enacting terms, immediately 
after the preamble, as in mathematical and physical works where the 
definitions are necessary premises, “indispensable for a logical or 
systematic investigation of a subject matter” (Cairns 1936: 1100). 
Although legal definitions, as nominal definitions, have no truth value, 
in the context of EU regulations their intermediate position clarify what 
comes after – as suggested by Plato in the Phaedrus –, but may be no 
use for what has immediately come before, namely recitals and 
citations. As far as the WTO document and the US Act are concerned, 
the definitional sections are respectively in Annex 1C and in Title X 
(out of XII) thus in final position. This aspect recalls Kant and his point 
on definitions in philosophy which “are not the conditions of 
knowledge; they are what we hope to conclude with, not the raw 
material with which we begin” (White Beck 1956: 188). Although 
philosophical definitions serve a concluding function as they are the 
result of elaborations and thus the end product of speculative processes 
– which justifies their final position – in common law and international 
law legal definitions have a similar position but a different function. As 
a matter of fact, the final position of the two definitions at issue seems 
to provide extra rules or technical data that may be consulted by judges 
or other legal professionals in the practice of their profession as a 
reference and not as a premise or as the starting point for their 
judgement or counsel.  
The last aspect to consider is the type of legal definition, 
namely the methods followed by drafters to construct a given stipulative 
definition. The basic distinction that serves as a premise is between 
equative and non-equative definitions (Jopek-Bosiacka 2011: 18). The 
equative one is the typical legal definition which follows the structure 
of an equivalence, or a relation between a sign (the definiendum) and 
something that is not a sign (the definiens) through a defining 
connective. Within equative definitions it is possible to distinguish 
intensional (or analytic) definitions and extensional (or synthetic, or 
synonyms) definitions (Robinson 1954; Jopek-Bosiacka 2011; Alcáraz 
and Hughes 2014). Notwithstanding “statutory definitions are 
extensional” (Jopek-Bosiacka 2011: 19), the case of the EU definition 
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seems to be quite unusual: in the very first part (art.4) the habitual 
practice of formulating extensional definition with the phrase shall 
mean is replaced with the modal may followed by consist followed by 
a list of examples of what is meant by the word ‘signs’ and the effect is 
an extensional chain generated by a series of short ‘operational 
qualifications’ (Bhatia 1993: 103) which results in syntactic 
discontinuities. An example from art. 4 is presented in the scheme 
below:  
 
Graph 1. Graphic representation of syntactic discontinuity in EU trade mark 
definition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 7 ‘Absolute grounds for refusal’ and Article 8 ‘Relative grounds 
for refusal’ set the limits of the definiendum by means of exclusion 
which has – as a defining connective – the phrase shall not be registered 
six times, in complete accordance with the traditional rules of definition 
as set out by Stebbing (in Robinson 1954: 141), in particular with rule 
5 which provides that “The definiens should not be expressed 
negatively unless the definiendum is negative”. The definiendum here 
is the ‘refusal’, a list of the characteristics that a sign must not have to 
be accepted as a trade mark and the method adopted here is intensional. 
The other two definitions are relatively shorter than the 
European one which is made of 1420 words in contrast with 268 words 
in the WTO agreement and 78 words in the US statute.  
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In the WTO agreement the definiendum is positive, but some 
negative definiens are provided. The structure of this definition is less 
rigorous, from a cognitive point of view, as extension and intension as 
methods coexist and from a purely linguistic perspective, shall and may 
are used as nearly interchangeable items, with may which appear only 
in the affirmative form and shall in both affirmative and negative.  
The US statute definition hinges on two verbs: includes and 
applies, which is used to introduce the functions – and the 
characteristics – of a given trademark and thus to provide an intensional 
definition of the term. The brevity of the definition inserted in Lanham 
Act is not surprising: as a common law statute, the reasoning procedure 
is inductive, namely “it imputes a rule from a set of circumstances” 
(Robertson 2012: 1222) and the decision taken by members of the 
judiciary may become binding on all subsequent cases pursuant to the 
principle of precedence. In particular, a considerable number of cases – 
in the section devoted to the statement of the ratio decidendi of the case, 
“which leads to and justifies the pronouncement of the judgment” 
(Bhatia 1993: 130) – provide further stipulative intensional definitions 
of the term trade-mark. The exegetical function (and the prescriptive 
power) of the Courts has always been apparent: in Duro Pump and Mfg. 
Co. v. California Cedar Products Co. (1926), in California Packing 
Corp. v. Tillman Bendel (1930), and in Continental Corp. v. National 
Union Radio Corp. (1933), the provisions of the Trade-Mark Act of 
1905 (15 USCA § 85) have been interpreted to determine the legal and 
linguistic meanings (and implicatures) of the term ‘trade-mark’ which  
 
[…] is created chiefly by use which must be general, continuous, and 
exclusive and applied to goods and used in trade under such 
circumstances of publicity and length of use as to show an intention to 
adopt the mark for specific goods and to have become known as the 
distinguishing mark for such goods (Continental Corp. v. National 
Union Radio Corp., 67 F.2d 938, 942 7th Cir. 1933). 
 
and of the phrase “merchandise of the same descriptive properties” 
(section 5 and 16 of the Act): 
 
[…] the term “of the same descriptive properties” must be given its 
ordinary and colloquial meaning, and […] that the meaning of the 
phrase “merchandise of the same descriptive properties” must not only 
be ascertained in the light of the use of the words “goods of the same 
class,” […] and the words “of [substantially] the same descriptive 
properties” […], but must also be construed in connection with the 
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predominant phrase of the provision “as to be likely to cause confusion 
or mistake in the mind of the public or to deceive purchasers,” and the 
predominant word “distinguished” in the first part of the section. 
(California Packing Corp. v. Tillman Bendel, 40 F.2d 108, 108, 111 
C.C.P.A. 1930). 
 
A similar issue related to the choice of the name ‘FUCT’ for a clothes 
trademark and to its evocative (and potentially offensive power) is 
settled in Iancu v. Brunetti (2019) where “The meanings of ‘immoral’ 
and ‘scandalous’ are not mysterious, but resort to some dictionaries still 
helps to lay bare the problem.” Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 
(2019). Though the dispute concerns the adequacy of the name above-
mentioned for a trademark, the provisions that regulate the controversy 
cannot be found in the definitional section 45 of Lanham Act, but in 
section 2 – Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent 
registration. If in section 45 the definition provided is extensive, as a 
list of five items – word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof – which is “taken to be literal and […]explicitly complete in 
contrast with the default tendency to give three-part lists as symbolically 
complete” (Jeffries 2010: 70), in section 2 the definition is intensive, as 
an indented list of items whose standard form is a triple-negative 
common platform (No… refused… unless) at the beginning followed 
by the verbal group ‘consists of or comprises’ followed by a noun 
phrase which is pre-modified and post-qualified by a qualifying relative 
clause and a prepositional phrase. The example below, which is taken 
from section 2, is a graphic representation of the description provided 
above. The two parts (a) and (b) are examples of extensive definitions 
which exploit mainly three-part lists, which fulfil a symbolic 
completeness function.  
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Graph 2. Graphic representation of syntactic discontinuity in Lanham Act 
trademark definition.   
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In section 45, and as shown in its graphic representation below, 
to draw a comparison between the two definitional extracts, the 
definition is divided into two parts, too, but the former hinges on the 
verb includes, is extensive and fulfils an explicit completeness function 
thanks to a five-part list of items whose shape any trademark may 
assume. The latter hinges on the verb applies, is intensive and fulfils a 
symbolic completeness function thanks to a three-part list of actions – 
which a trademark allows people to perform in business and commerce 
– and frequent syntactic discontinuities. 
In particular, the scheme below emphasises the double structure 
of the US act definition (Section 45), where extensive and intensive 
‘steps’ (Hyland 2012; Rasmussen and Engberg 1999) coexist, and 
confirms legislative provisions as “two-part interactive move-structure 
consisting of the main ‘provisionary clause’ and the attendant 
qualifications” (Bhatia 1993: 130) whose cognitive structure displays a 
non-linear organization due to the interplay of the main provisionary 
clause and its qualifications or discontinuities. 
 
Graph 3. Graphic representation of syntactic discontinuity in WTO Agreement 
trademark.  
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As it frequently happens in EU legal documents too and as 
demonstrated by Cutts and Wagner (2002), in the US act further 
definitional information is not provided in the section devoted to 
definitions (Section 45) but ‘somewhere else’ (Section 2): as suggested 
by Cutts and by the principles which underlie the Plain Language 
Movement, it would be better to “group all the definitions in one place 
for ease of reference” (Cutts and Wagner 2002: 11). Yet, given this 
peculiarity, both the US act and the EU legal documents, may be 
considered as ‘diffused stipulative definitions’ which develop 
throughout the whole document by alternating extensive with intensive 
communicative steps, which symbolically and explicitly express 
completeness in a partially successful attempt to be all-inclusive and 
precise.   
4. Conclusion 
From the analysis of the definitions which made up the corpus, the EU 
definition seems to leave not too much wiggle room to readers and 
interpretants, or at least seems to cover as many cases as possible, 
though it is impossible for any legal definition to cover and foresee 
every possibility that can arise (Robertson 2012). It is possible to say 
that the trade(-)mark case is neither an example of the use of a common 
word with an uncommon meaning nor the deliberate use of a word with 
a flexible meaning: it is an attempt at extreme precision as “[e]xplicit 
definition is simply a particular application of the law’s major approach 
to precision, i.e., an attempt to put a brand on the mavericks of speech 
[…] to distinguish the language of the law from common tongue” 
(Mellinkoff 1963: 23).  
Thus the findings of this research confirm the premises, that is 
common law and civil law linguistic and textual peculiarities merge 
originally in the EU law, where a code-based written deductive 
approach – well aware of the constraints afore mentioned – may count 
on a court-oriented and inductive reasoning where the predictive 
function of law, despite the abstract context anticipated in legal text 
written in ‘advance’, may provide certainty and regularity in civil 
society. From the analysis carried out on the definitions of ‘trademark’, 
stipulative legal definition as a genre results “a staged, goal-oriented, 
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social activity” – to paraphrase Martin (1986) definition of genre – 
where different methods of definition corresponds to different, but 
predictable stages or moves (Bhatia 1993), aimed at establishing how 
to use – and how to interpret – a given legal term in the context of a 
legal document and at involving laypeople and experts due to their 
performative nature. The particularity of common law and the 
generality of civil law result in a cross-cultural generic variation in the 
context of the European legal discourse where the definitional section 
provide terminological explanation and define the domain of 
application of the term ‘trade mark’. As demonstrated above, selected 
facts lead to the legal drafting (rules) which as a reference has an ideal 
world. Case law represents the world of reality where relevant facts are 
taken into account to construe the meaning which is constructed by 
drafting and which is rarely of universal application (Bhatia 1993). 
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